

NOT RELEASABLE TO  
FOREIGN NATIONALS

CONTINUED CONTROL

8 July 1956

SC No. 02541/56  
Copy No. 105

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 34  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS  
11 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2005  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE 7-26-56 REVIEWER: 372044

## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, U. S. Code title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798, the transmission or the revelation of the contents of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS  
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES**

It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information. The security of this document must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

TOP SECRET

*Comments and interpretations in this publication are based on all sources, including COMINT, and represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. The Office of Research and Reports and the Office of Scientific Intelligence contribute or are consulted on subjects within their spheres of responsibility.*

*The classification of a comment is noted separately only when it is higher than that of the report commented on.*

25X1A

CONTENTS

1. ANTILEFTISTS FORCE RESIGNATION OF SYRIAN CHIEF  
OF STAFF [REDACTED] (page 3).

25X1A

25X1A

2. SOVIET AID AGREEMENT WITH CAMBODIA [REDACTED]  
(page 4).

3. FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY SEEN ADJUSTING TO  
DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN [REDACTED] (page 5). 25X1A

25X6□

4.

- [REDACTED]
5. NORWEGIAN MINISTERS CONCERNED BY IMPACT ON  
SCANDINAVIA OF NEW SOVIET LINE [REDACTED] (page 7).

25X1A

6. YUGOSLAVS DISCLAIM ANY IMMEDIATE INTENTION TO  
RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY [REDACTED] (page 8). 25X1A

7. SOVIET AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES GERMAN REUNIFICATION  
WITH WEST GERMAN SOCIALISTS [REDACTED] (page 9).

25X1A

\* \* \* \*

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

[REDACTED] (page 10)

25X1A

8 July 56


Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 2

25X1A

**1. ANTILEFTISTS FORCE RESIGNATION OF SYRIAN CHIEF  
OF STAFF**

25X1A



The resignation on 7 July of General Shawqat Shuqayr, Syrian chief of staff, appears to be the initial result of a move by rightist army and civilian elements to eliminate leftist influence in the Syrian army. Shuqayr's resignation was forced by a group of antileftist senior officers, the minister of defense, and apparently a faction split off from the "little RCC" junior officer group. The leaders of the action, Brigadier General Tawfiq Nizam al-Din, Shuqayr's deputy, and Colonel Omar

Kabbani, a high staff officer, have become chief and deputy chief of staff respectively. Brigadier General Aziz Abd al-Karim, chief of the Syrian air force, is reported to have been appointed assistant chief of staff.

Although the antileftist group has assumed at least temporary control in an action which has been bloodless up to now, its strength and staying power have not yet been determined. The group may not continue to retain the support of the "little RCC" faction led by Colonel Nufouri, Syrian G-1. Moreover, the antileftists have not yet moved against Colonel Sarraj, Syrian G-2, and top leader of the "little RCC," but they plan to do so. The antileftist action may precipitate a countermove by army supporters of the Communist Party and the leftist Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (ASRP) before the rightists can consolidate their position. Moreover, Egypt, which has backed the ASRP and Shuqayr, and which probably suspects an Iraqi-Turkish maneuver, may directly encourage an ASRP-led countermove.

Shuqayr, chief of staff since July 1953, had little personal following and remained in power principally because of his professional ability and political agility. Since February 1954, he has associated with and supported the ASRP and has been marked as a target for removal by both rightists and "little RCC" elements.

25X1A

8 July 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 3

25X1A

25X1A

**2. SOVIET AID AGREEMENT WITH CAMBODIA****Comment on:**

25X1A

The Soviet Union's pledge of economic and technical assistance to Cambodia highlights the increasing success of the Sino-Soviet bloc in exploiting Cambodia's neutralism and its desire for economic expansion. The agreement follows closely the conclusion of negotiations for a \$22,400,000 Communist Chinese economic aid program in Cambodia.

The USSR, according to a joint communiqué, has expressed its readiness to send technicians to train Cambodian personnel, to provide industrial equipment, and, as a gift, to build and equip a hospital in Phnom Penh. Prince Sihanouk, leader of the Cambodian delegation, is said to be fully satisfied with the results of the Moscow talks-- suggesting that the aid will be on favorable long-range terms and will dovetail with other Cambodian foreign aid arrangements.

Although Sihanouk's concept of neutralism in playing both sides to advance his country's economic development has occasioned some criticism in Cambodia, his political influence has thus far effectively overcome such objections. The prospect of increased Soviet and Chinese ties with Cambodia may prove disturbing to India, in view of Nehru's hopes to expand his own influence there. [REDACTED]

25X1A

8 July 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 4

25X1A  
[REDACTED]

25X1A

### 3. FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY SEEN ADJUSTING TO DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN

25X1A

[REDACTED]

The American embassy in Paris is inclined to believe that the French Communist Party leadership is successfully orienting the party in the new situation brought about by de-Stalinization. Maurice Thorez is said to "continue to believe" that the best chance for the future success of the party lies in close, although better-disguised, ties with Moscow.

Most reliable observers appear to agree that major changes in party leadership in the near future are probably unlikely. Thorez has re-established party discipline among the rank and file.

#### Comment

The Stalin issue does not seem to have weakened the Communist party in France. In a 1 July assembly by-election the Communists ran second and maintained the same percentage of votes as in the national elections in January. On 6 July the party's central committee unanimously approved the 30 June resolution of the Soviet central committee which "shows how the cult of the personality of Stalin has been surmounted in the USSR."

25X1A

25X6

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5


Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600340001-5

25X1A

5. NORWEGIAN MINISTERS CONCERNED BY IMPACT ON  
SCANDINAVIA OF NEW SOVIET LINE

25X1A

25X6



On 4 July, Norway proposed that a NATO ministerial meeting be held in September to discuss "primarily defense problems."

Comment              Both the Norwegian and Danish governments are certain to face increased parliamentary pressure for a general reduction in defense spending when the parliaments reconvene this fall. It appears likely that Denmark will reduce its defense expenditures by some five percent, and would follow Norway's lead if Oslo sought a larger reduction.

8 July 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 7

25X1A



25X1A

**6. YUGOSLAVS DISCLAIM ANY IMMEDIATE INTENTION  
TO RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY**

25X1A

[REDACTED] Yugoslav foreign secretary Popovic on 25X6  
5 July told [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that his government had no im-  
mediate intention of recognizing East

25X6

\* Germany in view of the attitude of Yugoslavia's "Western  
friends." He said he looked forward to the day when circum-  
stances would permit his government to do so.

Comment

This is the frankest statement of Yugoslav  
intentions toward East Germany since  
Tito's Moscow visit, during which he formally acknowledged  
the existence of two "sovereign" German states.

Yugoslavia is undoubtedly fearful that to  
extend diplomatic recognition to East Germany now would  
seriously jeopardize West German ratification of the favor-  
able financial settlement recently concluded with Bonn. Also,  
Belgrade is probably concerned that the move would be re-  
garded by the West as proof that Yugoslavia had in fact solidly  
aligned itself with the Soviet bloc.

8 July 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 8

25X1A


25X1A

**7. SOVIET AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES GERMAN REUNIFICATION  
WITH WEST GERMAN SOCIALISTS**

25X1A

Soviet ambassador Zorin reportedly had a long but largely inconclusive discussion in June with the leaders of the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD),

25X1C

A large rectangular area of the document has been completely blacked out, obscuring several paragraphs of text.

**Comment**

The USSR has been maintaining publicly that unification is strictly a matter for discussion between the two German states. Except for a few left-wingers, the Social Democrats oppose such discussions. The other views attributed to Zorin seem to echo the SPD's own line. Since Moscow has never hinted that any of the present East German leaders might be dropped, it appears that if Zorin did so, he was attempting to convince the SPD that some progress toward unification might be made, and thus increase their criticism of the Bonn government.

8 July 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 9


25X1A

25X1A      **THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION**  
(Information as of 1700, 8 July)

Refuting reports from Arab capitals of Israeli troops massing on the Jordanian border, the American embassy in Tel Aviv reported that, while routine maneuvers were in progress, there was no unusual disposition of Israeli forces on the borders as of 7 July, and that usual week-end leaves were granted army personnel. While the borders could be reinforced in a matter of hours under Israel's system of mobilization, the embassy considers that troops are not deployed in a manner to justify Jordan's charges.

25X1A

25X6□



25X6



Awareness that Jordan's inadequately supplied forces could not cope with a determined Israeli attack may have induced Hussain to publicize Israel's threat in the hope of forestalling any Israeli action. A successful Israeli blow against Jordan could bring a disastrous popular reaction against both the king and his young chief of staff.

25X1A

Prolongation of the alert, despite reassurances that Israeli troops were not massed, may also reflect uneasiness in

8 July 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 10

25X1A



25X1A

Jordan over the consequences of current political maneuvering in Syria. Jordan's principal immediate political question appeared temporarily settled with the king's proclamation of a date (21 October) for election of a new lower house of the legislature. There had been reports from Jordan that the king might attempt to use the "crisis" with Israel to postpone elections and rule by decree.

25X1A [REDACTED]

25X1A

An Israeli Foreign Ministry official has expressed the view that allegations of Israeli troop concentrations may have been intended to disguise the reason for movement of Iraqi troops to the Jordan border, which he considered to be one phase of an effort to offset the extension of Egyptian influence in Jordan. [REDACTED]

25X6 □

[REDACTED]

Israeli maneuvers of unknown size are being held in the area of the Northern Command, which borders on Syria and Jordan, according to the American army attaché in Tel Aviv. A "substantial" northward movement of troops and materiel has taken place--including possibly a battalion of tanks and requisitioned civilian vehicles. These maneuvers are further confirmed by an invitation to foreign military attachés to view "brigade maneuvers in the northern area on 9 and 10 July." The attaché believes that the belated invitation may be intended to reassure foreign embassies in view of Arab charges of Israeli troop concentrations.

25X1A [REDACTED]